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THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY
IN BRAZILIAN LAW
Alexandre dos Santos Cunha*
INTRODUCTION
The idea that rights serve a social function was first introduced into
Brazilian legal culture about a century ago. Although the concept is
historically linked to the French scholar Léon Duguit, the Brazilian version
is distinct and does not share these French origins. Twentieth-century
Italian jurists Pietro Cogliolo and Enrico Cimbali, who both exerted
overwhelming influence over the so-called “Renovators” of Brazilian
Private Law, are primarily responsible for Brazil’s version.1 Unlike Duguit,
Cogliolo and Cimbali construed the concept of a social function as a
justification for imposing only external limits on the exercise of rights.2
Consequently, Brazilian courts have never considered Duguit’s
understanding of the social function of property as a source of internal
limitations.
The concept of the social function of rights first appeared in the Brazilian
Constitution in 1934, and has become considerably stronger since the
country adopted a new Civil Code in 2002. This Essay focuses on the 2002
Code’s impact on the way jurists and courts understand the concept,
especially with respect to the social function of property. This Essay is
divided into four parts. Part I presents a brief history of Brazilian property
law, Part II discusses the social function of property as a legal principle,
Part III discusses it as a structural element of property, and Part IV
discusses it as a structural element of rights.

* J.D., LL.M., S.J.D (Federal University of the State of Rio Grande do Sul—UFRGS, Porto
Alegre, Brazil), Researcher at the National Institute for Applied Economic Research—IPEA,
Brasília, Brazil. This Essay was originally translated from Brazilian Portuguese by Andrei
dos Santos Cunha.
1. Cogliolo’s most influential work was his book Filosofia del Diritto Privato (The
Philosophy of Private Law), published in 1912. Cimbali’s most influential work was his
book Nuova fase del Diritto Civile nei rapporti economici e sociali (The Transformation of
Civil Law in Economic and Social Relations), published in 1907.
2. Judith Hofmeister Martins-Costa, Reflexões Sobre o Princípio da Função Social dos
Contratos, in O DIREITO DA EMPRESA E DAS OBRIGAÇÕES E O NOVO CÓDIGO CIVIL
BRASILEIRO 218, 218–48 (Alexandre dos Santos Cunha coord., 2006). Cogliolo and
Cimbali’s understanding developed from the ideas of German jurist Otto von Gierke. See id.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN PROPERTY LAW
Portugal’s occupation of Brazil is a unique episode in the history of the
European colonization of the Americas. Unlike Spain, Portugal applied a
model of absolute centralized administration to her newly acquired
territories, instead of promoting colonial institutions. The colonies utilized
the same political, administrative, and judicial organization and the same
legal norms—especially the Ordenações do Reino (the Kingdom’s Legal
Rules)—as the metropolitan territories. Brazil and Portugal’s legal
professionals were educated at Coimbra University in Portugal.3 Indeed,
the Portuguese Crown considered the Brazilian territory as integral a part of
its property as the Moorish territories that the Kingdom had reclaimed in
the eleventh and fourteenth centuries.
As a result, the colonization of Brazil followed the same pattern of
development that Portugal followed in the fourteenth century.4 The Crown
employed the sesmaria—a system of land management first used under
Ferdinand I in 1375—to distribute property among private entrepreneurs
and to promote colonization.5 Because the land remained public property,
we might describe the sesmaria in modern legal terminology as a kind of
gratuitous concession of the right to use the land, subject to a series of
conditions such as limiting the land’s occupation and restricting its use to
certain stipulated economic activities.6 The sesmaria could be transferred
by contract or through inheritance, but restrictions on the right of use could
not be altered. The Crown could reclaim the land if one failed to observe
these conditions. Beginning in 1534, Portugal promoted the occupation of
Brazilian territory through sesmarias, and by the time Brazil gained its
independence between 1821 and 1824, it had distributed all land near the
coast.7 The Brazilian sesmarias closely resembled those distributed in
southern Portugal: they were attached to large tracts of land, concentrated
in the hands of a small group of latifundium estate landowners, employed
intensive slave labor, and specialized in cultivating monoculture crops for
export.
The unique process that led to Brazil’s independence meant that any
changes from the Portuguese legal system developed extremely slowly,
3. LUIS WECKMANN, LA HERENCIA MEDIEVAL DEL BRASIL 81–105, 236–49 (1993).
4. See Luiz Antonio Ferraro Júnior & Marcel Bursztyn, Das Sesmarias à Resistência
ao Cercamento: razões históricas dos Fundos de Pasto, 23 CADERNO CRH 385, 387 (2010)
(Braz.).
5. WECKMANN, supra note 3, at 106–15.
6. LAURA BECK VARELA, DAS SESMARIAS À PROPRIEDADE MODERNA: UM ESTUDO DE
HISTÓRIA DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO (2005).
7. RAYMUNDO FAORO, OS DONOS DO PODER: FORMAÇÃO DO PATRONATO POLÍTICO
BRASILEIRO (1958). Brazil’s independence was a peculiar affair. After Napoleon invaded
Portugal in 1807, the Portuguese Royal Court was forced to move from Lisbon to Rio de
Janeiro. This promoted Brazil from a mere colony to a formal part of the United Kingdom
of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves. When King John VI returned to Lisbon in 1821, it was
determined that the Crown Prince of Portugal would continue to rule Brazil. After a long
series of quarrels with the Portuguese Parliament in Lisbon, however, the Crown Prince
arranged to be crowned Brazil’s first Emperor in 1822.
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especially in the domain of Private Law. 8 Although the Brazilian
Constitution of 1824, which created the new Brazilian Empire, stipulated
that a Civil Code would be written, 9 a lack of consensus prevented the
drafting of a definite version. And while nineteenth-century efforts to
codify a Private Law statute did result in the creation of some important
documents, 10 the first Brazilian Civil Code was not adopted until 1916,
twenty-seven years after the formation of the Brazilian Republic in 1889.
Thus, the Ordenações Filipinas, decreed by King Philip II of Portugal and
Spain in 1603, remained in effect in Brazilian territory until 1917, fifty
years after they had been revoked in Portugal.
However, adopting norms concerning land disputes could not wait for the
vicissitudes of codification. With independence came the dissolution of the
sesmaria system, leaving Brazil with no legal instrument governing land
appropriation. This made it extremely difficult to promote agrarian frontier
expansion and to grant rural credit in the absence of reliable collateral.
Thus, in 1850, the Brazilian Parliament approved Imperial Law No. 601, 11
popularly known as the Lei de Terras (Land Statute), along with other
attempts at structural economic reform aimed at preparing the country for
the gradual abolition of slavery.
The Land Statute created private property in Brazil for the first time. The
statute mirrored the Continental Law’s definition of the concept of
dominium by treating private property as an individual and absolute right.
It converted sesmaria rights holders into landowners of the estates they
already held, and extended the same ownership rights to anyone who
possessed public land for at least 100 years before the statute’s passage. In
this way, the statute perpetuated the concentration of rural property in the
hands of the same few who held the land in colonial times, effectively
blocking the distribution of land to the European and Japanese immigrants
who came to Brazil after independence.
The Land Statute had no social concerns. Its main aim, successfully
achieved, was preventing immigrants and former slaves from becoming
landowners. Rather than promoting the settlement of new families in rural
8. Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, O Ensino Jurídico e o Processo Codificatório Civil
Brasileiro, DIREITO EM REVISTA, May 2002, at 43 (Braz.).
9. CONSTITUICÂO POLITICA DO IMPERIO DO BRAZIL (1824) art. 179(XVIII).
10. The most important of the many code projects proposed during the Empire was the
Esboço de Código Civil Brasileiro (A Draft Civil Code of Brazil), written by Augusto
Teixeira de Freitas, a follower of Savigny and the Historical School, between 1857 and
1866. Although the Empire never adopted it, Freitas’s text strongly influenced the Civil
Codes of Argentina, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Particularly remarkable is that the
Esboço’s assumptions were markedly different from the mainstream paradigms of the time,
especially those established by the Code Napoléon and the Código Civil de Chile, and was
three decades ahead of the model that would finally be adopted by the Buergerliches
Gesetzbuch. To a certain extent, the Esboço also heralded the strong influence German
thought would have over Brazilian legal doctrine throughout that country’s history. Cf.
Cunha, supra note 8.
11. Lei No. 601, de 18 de Setembro de 1850, COL. LEIS IMPERIO BRASIL, tomo 11, pt.1:
307.
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areas and redistributing land, it deliberately inflated property values by
creating a scarcity of estate deeds. In transforming rural estates into
commodities, it created a substitute for slave ownership to deal with
problems of capital immobilization, value reservation, and provision of debt
collateral. 12 At the same time, the dominium concept authorized changes to
the original use restrictions on the sesmaria grant. The ability to alter the
land’s use was essential to the diversification of the Brazilian economy
from primarily sugar exports to the production of coffee, cotton, and rubber.
The 1916 Civil Code made only one substantial modification to the
former Empire’s Land Statute system. To strengthen the dominium deeds
against alternative, informal modes of land appropriation or possession,
publicly notarized registration of real estate—which the Lei Hipotecária
(Mortgage Statute) originally authorized in 1864 13—became compulsory.
This introduced Brazil to the recording of deeds at a real estate registration,
a mode of dominium acquisition borrowed from German Private Law.
The draft Civil Code originally contained an innovative limitation on the
exercise of property rights by providing that “[t]his statute protects, within
the limits of the law, the owner’s right to make whatever use he sees fit of
his property, and to claim this property, in the case of corporeal goods, from
those who unlawfully possess it.” 14 However, the Federal Parliament
omitted this text from the final version, which simply provided that “[t]his
law assures to the owner the right to use, enjoy and dispose of his property,
and to recover it from the power of whoever unjustly possesses it.” 15
II. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY APPLIED AS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE
Although the draft Code of 1916 did not expressly introduce the concept
of a social function of property, its author, Clovis Bevilaqua, understood it
as expressing that principle. In Bevilaqua’s words, property rights must be
subjected to “restrictions determined by considerations of social order,”
which is why “modern Codes are leaning toward finding a balance between
the individual’s interest and that of society.” 16 The balance does not spring
from an individual’s action, but rather from the statutory law, which
“expresses the conditions of social life, at each moment.”17

12. See generally ZÉLIA MARIA CARDOSO DE MELLO, METAMORFOSES DA RIQUEZA, SÃO
PAULO, 1845-1895: CONTRIBUIÇÃO AO ESTUDO DA PASSAGEM DA ECONOMIA MERCANTILESCRAVISTA À ECONOMIA EXPORTADORA CAPITALISTA (1990).
13. Lei No. 1237, de 24 de Setembro de 1864, COL. LEIS IMPERIO BRASIL, tomo 24, pt.1:
69.
14. “A lei assegura ao proprietario, dentro dos limites por ella traçados, o direito de
utilizar-se de seus bens, como entender e de reivildical-os, quando corporeos, do poder de
quem, injustamente, os possua.” 1 CLOVIS BEVILAQUA, DIREITO DAS COISAS 134 (1941).
15. “A lei assegura ao proprietário o direito de usar, gozar e dispor de seus bens, e de
reave-los do poder de quem quer que injustamente os possua.” CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] (1916)
art. 524 (Braz.).
16. 1 BEVILAQUA, supra note 14, at 134.
17. Id.
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In the same vein as other “Renovators” of Brazilian Private Law,
Bevilaqua perceived the social function of property as a legal principle that
was likely to justify external limitations on property rights imposed by
statutory law. In the Renovators’ view, “the rights and restrictions belong
to separate dimensions; the restrictions are always seen as ‘disadvantages,’
externally imposed upon the rights; the scope of protection of a right is
wider than what it effectively ensures, because, upon unrestricted rights,
limits are imposed that reduce the initial scope of protection.”18
Because the Federal Parliament omitted it from the 1916 Civil Code, the
social function of property remained a mere legal principle until the
Brazilian Constitution of 1934 established it as a constitutional principle.
In its bill of individual rights, the Constitution established that “the right of
property is protected, provided it is not exerted against any social or
collective interests, in the forms determined by the law.” 19 According to
Brazilian legal doctrine, the idea of “any social or collective interests”
encompasses the concept of a social function of property; it thus acquires
constitutional status and may be put into effect according to “the forms
determined by the law.” 20 In other words, social function becomes an
external limitation that the government must impose on the exercise of
property rights. 21 Pursuant to this authorization, limitations were enacted in
normative instruments of urban policy, such as the Lei de Loteamento para
Venda de Terrenos em Prestações 22 (Statute Concerning the Plotting of
Land to be Sold in Installments) and the Estatuto da Cidade 23 (City
Statute), as well as legislation concerning agrarian policy, such as the

18. Martins-Costa, supra note 2, at 232.
19. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DO BRASIL (1934) art. 113.17.
20. Id.
21. All Brazilian Constitutions since 1934 have, more or less explicitly, made room for
the social function of property. The 1937 text established the authoritarian regime of the
Estado Novo, which stipulated that “the nature and limits [of property rights] shall be
defined by the laws which regulate its use.” CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DOS ESTADOS
UNIDOS DO BRASIL (1937) art. 122(XIV) (Interdepartmental Comm. on Cooperation with the
Am. Republics trans., 1939). When Brazil became a democracy again, the 1946 Constitution
stated that “the use of property shall be conditioned upon social welfare.” CONSTITUIÇÃO DOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS DO BRASIL (1946) art. 147 (A.J. Peaslee trans., 1950). During the Military
Dictatorship, the 1967 Constitution determined that “[i]t is the purpose of the economic and
social order to achieve social justice, on the basis of the following principles: . . . The social
function of property.” CONSTITUIÇÃO DO BRASIL (1967) art. 157(III) (A.J. Peaslee trans.,
1967). The current Constitution states that “property shall observe its social function.”
CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL (1988) art. 5(XXIII) (Official Senate
translation).
22. Decreto No. 58, de 10 de Dezembro de 1937, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
13.12.1937 (Braz.). For more about the Lei de Loteamento para Venda de Terrenos em
Prestações as a normative instrument of urban policy, see Alexandre dos Santos Cunha,
Informal Land Subdivision and Real Estate Regularization: A Comparative Study Between
Colombia and Brazil, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 315 (2009).
23. Lei No. 10.257, de 10 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
11.7.2001 (Braz.).
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Estatuto da Terra 24 (Land Statute) and the Lei da Reforma Agrária25 (Land
Reform Law).
An analysis of Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court)
(STF) precedent clearly demonstrates that Brazil adopted this interpretation
of the social function of property clause in the 1988 Constitution. 26 A
simple query of STF court decisions interpreting this clause over the last
five years returned thirty related opinions, which analyze its application in
four different contexts: (1) the constitutionality of judicial instruments
created by the City Statute; (2) the progressive taxation on urban property;
(3) the expropriation of condominium land for land reform; and (4) the
determination of the rights of the occupants of public land.
The City Statute established general guidelines concerning urban law and
policies that must be observed by municipalities.27 The statute also
provided for the “onerous concession of the right to build” (outorga
onerosa do direito de construir), a mechanism by which the municipality
can force an individual to pay for any construction that exceeds the surface
area of his or her own land. 28 In Koerich Participações Administração e
Construção LTDA v. Município de Florianópolis 29 (Koerich Inc. v. County
of Florianopolis), the STF held that this is “an instrument directed at the
correction of distortions brought about by unruly urban growth, at the
promotion of the full development of the functions of the city, and at the
application of the principle of the social function of property.” 30 Therefore,
it is an external limit imposed by a city’s Urban Development Plan and
authorized by the social function principle.
The same understanding permeates the debate over the progressive
taxation of urban real estate. The 1988 Constitution required that
municipalities tax urban real estate.31 “[I]n order to ensure achievement of
the social function of property,” such taxes should be graduated. 32 In Melo

24. Lei No. 4.504, de 30 de Novembro de 1964, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
30.11.1964 (Braz.).
25. Lei No. 8.629, de 25 de Fevereiro de 1993, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
26.2.1993 (Braz.).
26. See supra note 21 (explaining that each Brazilian constitution has incorporated a
social function of property clause). The STF was created by the 1891 Constitution, which
also founded the republican regime and the federal system in Brazil. Throughout its history,
the STF performed functions similar to those of the U.S. Supreme Court. Since the adoption
of the 1988 Constitution, it has become closer in character to European constitutional courts,
but retains its status as the highest court of the Judicial Branch.
27. See Lei No. 10.257, de 10 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
11.7.2001 (Braz.).
28. See id. The payment may be in money, land, work, or services. See id.
29. S.T.F., Recurso Extraordinário No. 387.047, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, 06.03.2008,
2317, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 02.05.2008,
799 (Braz.).
30. Id. at 804.
31. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL (1988) art. 156 (Official
Senate translation).
32. Id. ¶ 1.
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v. Municipio de Belo Horizonte 33 (Melo v. County of Belo Horizonte), the
STF severely curtailed the municipal power to levy such taxes. The STF
held that while such taxes may be graduated in time, the municipalities
could not base the tax rate on the real estate’s use or value.34 This decision
spurred a political movement in support of municipalities that culminated in
the passage of the Twenty-ninth Constitutional Amendment, which
enlarged municipal taxing power. 35 Despite this development, the STF
continues to strictly control property tax legislation through its
interpretations of the social function principle. 36
III. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY APPLIED
AS A STRUCTURAL ELEMENT OF PROPERTY
A survey of STF decisions over the last five years reveals that there are
other, more exotic interpretations of the social function of property. In
Estácio de Souza Leão Filho v. Presidente da República 37 (Estácio de
Souza Leão Filho v. President of the Republic), Rafaeli e outro v.
Presidente da República 38 (Rafaeli et al. v. President of the Republic), and
Siqueira e outro v. Presidente da República 39 (Siqueira et al. v. President
of the Republic), the STF deemed it necessary to determine whether the
social function of property is a structural element of property rights
themselves or the land to which the rights belong. The three cases were
fairly similar. The plaintiffs, owners of condominium lands in rural areas,
were attempting to annul a presidential act expropriating the estate for land
reform. According to the 1988 Constitution:
It is within the power of the Union to expropriate on account of social
interest, for purposes of agrarian reform, the rural property which is not
performing its social function, against prior and fair compensation in
agrarian debt bonds with a clause providing for maintenance of the real
value, redeemable within a period of up to twenty years computed as from

33. S.T.F., Recurso Extraordinário No. 153.771, Relator: Min. Moreira Alves,
20.11.1996, 1881, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.],
05.09.1997, 496 (Braz.).
34. Id. at 572.
35. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL (1988) amend. XXIX (Official
Senate translation).
36. The most recent case on the matter is Gasparin v. Município de Curitiba (Gasparin
v. County of Curitiba), S.T.F., Recurso Extraordinário No. 595.080, Relator: Min. Joaquim
Barbosa, 31.08.2010, 2417, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO
[S.T.F.J.e.], 01.10.2010, 1299 (Braz.).
37. S.T.F., Mandado de Segurança No. 24.573, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, 12.06.2006,
2260, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 15.12.2006,
160 (Braz.).
38. S.T.F., Mandado de Segurança No. 25.299, Relator: Min. Sepúlveda Pertence,
14.06.2006, 2246, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.],
08.09.2006, 178 (Braz.).
39. S.T.F. Mandado de Segurança No. 26.129, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, 14.06.2007,
2286, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 24.08.2007,
563 (Braz.).
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the second year of issue, and the use of which shall be defined in the
law. 40

The Constitution further specifies:
The social function is met when the rural property complies
simultaneously with, according to the criteria and standards prescribed by
law, the following requirements:
(I) rational and adequate use;
(II) adequate use of available natural resources and preservation of the
environment;
(III) compliance with the provisions that regulate labour relations;
(IV) exploitation that favours the well-being of the owners and
labourers. 41

On the other hand, “[e]xpropriation of the following for agrarian reform
purposes is not permitted: (I) small and medium-size rural property, as
defined by law, provided its owner does not own other property; (II)
productive property.” 42
In all three cases, the act of expropriation was imposed upon rural estates
that were not following the constitutional principle of “rational and
adequate use”: they did not reach the “degree of land use” nor the “degree
of efficiency in the exploitation” of land required by the Land Reform
Statute. Although the plaintiffs’ estates fell into the category of large-size
rural property, they all belonged to more than one owner in a condominium
regime. 43 Each individual owner’s share would only constitute a small or
medium-size rural property and thus could not be expropriated for land
reform. 44 For this reason, the owners asked the STF to pronounce that the
act of expropriation was abusive.
From a Private Law perspective, these were easy cases. Brazilian
statutes, like their counterparts in many civil law systems, do not provide
for the coexistence of property rights on one parcel of land. When a piece
of property is held in condominium, it has only one property right that is
exercised simultaneously by multiple individuals. As they share this single
right, they must exercise it in conformity with its social function. If they do
not, the state may expropriate the estate.
However, this debate took a totally different direction when argued
before a court with only one Private Law specialist. The STF justices split
into two groups. The dissenters favored the plaintiffs and argued that, in
the case of multiple owners, the ratio between the total area and the number
40. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL (1988) art. 184 (Official
Senate translation).
41. Id. art. 186.
42. Id. art. 185.
43. Estácio de Souza Leão Filho v. Presidente da República, S.T.F., Mandado de
Segurança No. 24.573, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, 12.06.2006, 2260, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL
FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 15.12.2006, 160, 162–64 (Braz.).
44. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL (1988) art. 185 (Official
Senate translation).
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of condominium participants must factor into the land’s categorization as
small, medium, or large-size rural estates. 45 The majority argued that the
social function is an attribute of the property itself, not of its owners or their
property rights. 46 Thus, one must consider only whether the land conforms
with its social function.
IV. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY APPLIED
AS A STRUCTURAL ELEMENT OF RIGHTS
Debate concerning the convenience and necessity of a new Brazilian
Civil Code started as early as the 1940s, during World War II. In 1969, the
Ministry of Justice appointed a group of seven jurists, led by Miguel Reale,
to write a draft. Their draft was sent to Parliament in 1975, approved by the
Lower House in 1984, by the Senate in 2001, and finally promulgated in
2002. 47
Despite being created in the 1970s under the aegis of a right-wing
military dictatorship whose economic policies favored social exclusion and
income concentration, the 2002 Code is surprisingly socially oriented.
Because Reale came from the integralista movement (the Brazilian
equivalent of Catholic authoritarianism), he had a tendency toward
communitarian thinking. He believed that “[e]ven though socialism has not
triumphed, sociality has, and collective values must prevail over individual
ones, without the loss, however, of the founding value of the human
person.” 48 Therefore, a “social sense is one of the most remarkable traits of
the draft, in contrast with the individualism conditioning the [1916] Civil
Code.” 49
One way the 2002 Civil Code expresses this “social sense” is its
provision for “a new concept of property, based upon the constitutional
principle that the function of property must be social, [that] overcomes the
interpretation according to which . . . property is an exclusive function of
the interests of individuals, owners, or possessors.” 50 Although Reale
mentions the “constitutional principle” of the social function of property to
justify the legal imposition of limits on property rights, he is not among
those jurists who view the social function merely as an authorization to
impose external limits on those rights. Rather, he thinks that “the rights and
45. Estácio de Souza Leão Filho, 2260 S.T.F.J.e. at 165–71.
46. Id. at 177–87. The decision was reached by a vote of five to four. The majority
justices were Sepulveda Pertence (appointed by President Sarney in 1989), Cezar Peluso
(appointed by President Lula da Silva in 2003), Carlos Britto (appointed by President Lula
da Silva in 2003), Joaquim Barbosa (appointed by President Lula da Silva in 2003), and Eros
Grau (appointed by President Lula da Silva in 2004). The dissenting justices were Celso de
Mello (appointed by President Sarney in 1989), Marco Aurelio (appointed by President
Collor in 1990), Ellen Gracie (appointed by President Cardoso in 2000), and Gilmar Mendes
(appointed by President Cardoso in 2002).
47. For a comprehensive history of the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code, see MIGUEL REALE, O
PROJETO DO NOVO CÓDIGO CIVIL (2d ed. 1999).
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 6.
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the respective limits are immanent to any legal position; the definitive
contents of rights are, precisely, the contents resulting from this
understanding of rights ‘being born’ with limitations; therefore, the scope of
protection of a right is the scope of the effective guarantees this right
provides.” 51 This new understanding permeates the text of Article 1228 of
the 2002 Civil Code, whose first paragraph reads:
The right of property must be exercised in accordance with its
economic, social and environmental ends, so that the flora, fauna and
natural beauties are preserved, as well as the ecological equilibrium and
the historical and artistic patrimonies, and so that air and water pollution
are averted, in obedience of the rules established by specific legislation. 52

Thus, the 2002 Civil Code broke with mainstream Brazilian legal thought
by linking the exercise of property rights to economic, social, and
environmental ends. The Code internalizes the social function of property
by imposing a duty of solidarity upon the owner.
Although Reale’s conception approaches Duguit’s original theory, the
social function of property still risks being misunderstood by justice
professionals. STF precedents determining the rights of public land
occupants illustrate this risk. For example, in União v. Juíza Federal da
Vara Ambiental, Agrária e Residual de Curitiba 53 (Federal Government v.
Federal Environmental & Agrarian Court of Curitiba), squatters had
occupied public land since 1951 and had made significant investments to
make the land productive. Brazilian legislation since the 1850 Land
Statute, however, prohibited individuals from acquiring ownership of public
land through adverse possession; it can only be sold or donated pursuant to
government settlement programs or land reforms. Yet, because the
squatters in Curitiba had given the occupied land a social function, while
the Brazilian Union had done nothing to improve its use, Justice Ricardo
Lewandowski argued in dissent that they should at least be compensated for
their expenses. 54 The majority did not agree and held that the squatters had
not obtained any right to the public land they occupied, nor any right to
compensation for their investments. 55 Because the STF historically
interpreted the social function of property as a source of state-imposed
external limitations on property rights, it was very difficult for the justices
to understand that, as an internal limitation, it should apply to the Brazilian
Union in the same way it applies to private owners.

51. See Martins-Costa, supra note 2, at 232.
52. C.C. (2002) art. 1228 § 1 (Braz.).
53. S.T.F., Reclamação No. 3.437, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, 18.10.2007, 2417,
SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 02.05.2008, 316
(Braz.).
54. Id. at 336–38.
55. Id. at 318–32.
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CONCLUSION
Having been imported as a legal principle in the beginning of the
twentieth century and codified some seventy years ago, the social function
of property is not only well known and acknowledged by both legal
professionals and the general public in Brazil, but is also a structural
element of that country’s legal order. Nevertheless, the Brazilian
experience shows that certain legal models, like some wines, do not travel
well. Even though the 2002 Civil Code finally adopted theoretical
postulates similar to Duguit’s original proposals, Brazil’s original
misunderstanding of this idea has seriously biased the local legal
environment and hindered its application in accordance with the original
French formulation and the Code authors’ intent. It is probable that this
tension will result in an important dispute over the proper meaning of the
concept and, despite the efforts of some groups of thinkers, it is difficult to
say whether Brazil will embrace the French understanding. If it does not,
Brazilian law may forever remain a prisoner of exotic conceptions of the
social function of property.
Given this context, the question remains whether there is any value in
transplanting legal concepts. If another solution to the problem of land
concentration and the abusive use of property had been adopted, perhaps a
model closer to Brazil’s national tradition, it may have obtained similar or
even better results than the social function of property. It is possible that an
authentically Brazilian solution might have been more adequate—or at least
more easily understood by its legal professionals.

